

PROSE USAGES OF *AKOYEIN* ‘TO READ’

I

When we encounter the following words: ‘A few moments ago, I think, you heard Plato saying that there is no specific name for the art which deals with the body’, it is easy to put these into a literary context. We may imagine some kind of fictional dialogue, in which out of two or more partners one reminds another of what a few minutes ago Plato had said to them about a particular subject. Whether Plato is still present or has left the room, we do not yet know, and we hope to get this information from the rest of the book. The book might be an historical novel by, say, Mary Renault. So much is clear, and with our knowledge of the Classics we are sure that the book is not by a Classical author.

To take another example, what about a sentence like ‘You heard our Lord saying “Suffer the little children”’? Now because of the reference to a well-known passage from the Bible, we are inclined to imagine a different context, e.g. that of a sermon in a church service. There the congregation had heard a reading from Matthew 19.14 and now the preacher reminds them of these words. We do not imagine that Jesus himself was present at that moment, unless in a figurative sense. Finally, although we may not yet know the book, or sermon, these words have been taken from, they may well come from a patristic writing.

Indeed, these latter words are found in the *Oratio consol. in Pulcheriam* by Gregory of Nyssa (ix.465.1ff. Jaeger), and their immediate context refers to a reading from the Scripture: ... ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀναγνώσθεισαν ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ Εὐαγγελιστοῦ ῥῆσιν παραθυσόμεθα. ἡκούσατε γὰρ λέγοντος τοῦ Κυρίου. “Ἀφετε τὰ παιδία κτλ.”. The first passage, however, is a translation from the Greek in a treatise, *not* a fictional dialogue, written in the second century A.D. by Galen and addressed to a certain Thrasybulus: ἡκουσας δήπου ἀρτίως Πλάτωνος λέγοντος ὡς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον ὄνομα (sc. for πᾶσα ἢ περὶ τὸ σῶμα τέχνη) (*Thrasyb.* v.879.12 Kühn). When reading this treatise, we observe that at pp. 872–5 Galen has quoted passages from Plato’s *Republic* and *Gorgias* which discuss the matter in question, and when we come to the excerpted text we shall interpret these words as a reference to what a few moments ago Thrasybulus has *read*. Because we know that Plato had died in 349/8 B.C., we may think that Galen here used a rhetorical device of vivid description. For, so we think, he could have said ‘A few moments ago you read in Plato ...’.

In both passages we have the same Greek expression ἡκουσας (-ούσατε) Πλάτωνος (τοῦ Κυρίου) λέγοντος. Because of many parallels, to be discussed later, I reduce it to a standard expression ἡκουσα X λέγοντος.¹ In this paper I shall first argue that very often we should interpret statements of this kind as simple indications that someone has read something in a book by X, e.g. Plato. I shall also argue that this expression is the proper Greek idiom for ‘I have read in (e.g.) Plato that ...’, at least from the end of the Hellenistic period onwards. In order to strengthen my argument I shall look at the usage of well-known Greek verbs for reading, such as ἀναγιγνώσκειν, and

¹ Or, if one prefers, ἡκουσα τοῦ δεῖνα λέγοντος.

show that these were not used to express the notion of 'I've read in Plato that...' (§§ II–VIII). A corollary of my argument will be that these statements cannot be used as proof that X was alive at the moment the 'hearer' was reading his words, and, accordingly, the traditional interpretation of several passages will be queried (§ IX).

Already by now, it will be evident that the reason why the locution ἤκουσα X λέγοντος could have become the regular Greek idiom derives from the fact that in Antiquity reading aloud was the common way of reading. This fact no scholar doubts nowadays, there has been only some debate on the question whether silent reading was an almost unknown phenomenon, which, if it occurred, caused amazement. This debate came to an end when B. M. W. Knox proved that silent reading was not unusual at all.² Nevertheless, the preponderance of reading aloud is sufficient to explain the occurrence of the Greek idiom I am concerned with.

I shall also look briefly at the usage of ἀκούειν alone in the sense of 'to read', especially in epistolary prose (§§ X–XI). To a certain extent this was already done by Knox and his predecessors in the debate, but always in the context of the problem of silent reading. And none of them discussed texts containing the locution ἤκουσα X λέγοντος.

The corpus of texts I have investigated primarily consists of Greek prose writings present in the *TLG*. My search, with an IBYCUS computer, is fairly complete for texts from the fifth century B.C. down to about the fourth century A.D., and more selective for those of later centuries. Indices, random reading, and help from colleagues produced passages from texts not on the *TLG* disk. At an early stage I decided not to look further at poetic texts, having failed to find pertinent examples there.

II

In the expression ἤκουσα X_{gen} λέγοντος X stands for a person, or persons or personified things, whether named explicitly or left anonymous. The present participle λέγοντος may be replaced by an analogous form of other *verba dicendi*, such as ἀποφαίνεσθαι; substitution of the present tense by the aorist is possible but rare.³ Instead of the first person sing. indic. II aor. act. (ἤκουσα), other persons, tenses (ἀκούω, ἀκούσομαι, ἀκήκοα, but almost never ἤκουον), or moods, but no passive voice, may be found, whereas ἤκουσα is very common. Finally, the complement of the participle is a statement ('that...') or refers to one ('this').

For Classical Greek⁴ the semantic differences between the three phrases ἤκουσά τινος λέγοντος, τινα λέγοντα, and τινα λέγειν are according to Kühner–Gerth ii.68: 'Ἀκούειν *c. gen. et part.* von einer unmittelbaren, *c. acc. et part.* von einer zwar nur mittelbaren, aber sicheren und begründeten Wahrnehmung; *c. inf.* von einer nur als Geruch (durch Hörensagen) übermittelten Kunde.' Similar distinctions have been made by other scholars.⁵ The common denominator of all these is that the

² 'Silent Reading in Antiquity', *GRBS* 9 (1968), 421–35 with references to earlier discussions. See also the exchange of Letters to the Editor in *TLS* February–April 1991 with Ptol. *Jud.* 5, 2 as the earliest explicit reference to silent reading.

³ See e.g. W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (London, 1889, repr. 1965), § 48 on the differences between the two tenses in this expression. H. Weir Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, Mass., 1920, repr. 1956), § 2112 connects them with those in English between 'I see a house burning' and 'I see a house burn'.

⁴ For Homer the situation is different, see e.g. J. M. Stahl, *Kritisch-hist. Syntax d. gr. Verbums d. klass. Zeit* (Heidelberg, 1907), pp. 702f.

⁵ Cf. e.g. Stahl, op. cit., pp. 702ff. and 212f. and Goodwin, op. cit., §§ 884–6.

construction with the genitive refers to *direct perception without the help of an intermediary*, in contrast with those with an accusative. I accept these distinctions as valid, but will show that a *caveat* must be added.⁶

Ἦκουσα X_{gen} λέγοντος means 'I heard X saying (something/that ...)', whether in private conversation, public debate, law court, classroom, theatre, or whatever. Normally (e.g. D. 54.8, X. *Smp.* 4.55), the speaker implies that at the moment of speaking and listening both X and the hearer are alive and present. However, as we have seen, the locution also occurs in situations where X can only be said to speak by means of an intermediary who reads from his text. Reading aloud to an audience is done in various situations, not only in a church service, but also at home by a slave, the *anagnōstēs*⁷ and at school by the teacher. At a meeting of friends a poet may read his new poems,⁸ in court the clerk may read a law. A special case is the performance of a play on the stage. Then someone may say that he heard the author, or a character, speaking. Thus in Plut. *Sera num. vind.* 548d a certain Patrocleas first says ἔκπαλαι δ' ἡγανάκτουν ἀκούων Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος and goes on to quote a line from the *Orestes*. A few pages later (556a) Plutarch has someone else say ὥσπερ τῆς Ἰνούς ἀκούομεν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις λεγούσης, after which words follows Euripides fr. 399 Nauck².

In all these situations we observe that, strictly speaking, there is an intermediary between the author (character) who is said to speak and the listener. However, this intermediate person is being neglected in the presentation of the situation. In these cases the 'unmittelbare Wahrnehmung' Kühner–Gerth are referring to turns out not to be as direct as they would have us believe. And any impressions about the author being alive and present at the moment of listening (= reading) are not well founded.

Reading aloud, as we have seen, was common practice in Antiquity. When reading to himself the person who is reading aloud is identical to the listener. Given the neglect of the intermediary, noted above, the quotation from Galen will mean: 'A few moments ago you read in Plato that ...'. This explanation is valid, for Galen addresses his treatise to Thrasybulus himself – it is not, for example, a set of lecture notes.

III

For the moment we must conclude that in general the situations in which the phrase ἤκουσα X_{gen} λέγοντος occurs, are twofold: X is identical to the actual speaker and, accordingly, X is present (A); X is not identical to the actual speaker, and he is not present either (B).⁹ Because this paper focuses on cases of reading, I leave out of discussion any text bearing upon theatrical performances etc. As a result, the remaining principal difference between (A) and (B) is that in (B) some writing of X is being *read* to an audience without X being present. Inside group (B) I now make a distinction between official and public reading in court, church, classroom etc. (type

⁶ In Soph. *Phil.* 595f. and 614f. the two constructions occur without the difference of direct v. indirect perception, at least according to Goodwin, op. cit., § 886. Commentators *ad locc.* are silent on this point.

⁷ E.g. Cic. *Att.* 1.12.4, Plut. *Crass.* 2.7. The enormous literary production of Pliny the Elder was possible only because while being read to by his *lector* he made annotations (Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* 3.5).

⁸ E. Rohde, *Der griech. Roman*³ (Leipzig, 1914), pp. 327–9 lists many texts on readings of new or old literary works. Terms like δημοσίᾳ point to the character of a 'Vortrag'.

⁹ The latter clause is added because I have found no passages in which someone says that he heard Sophocles speaking, when in fact a tragedy by him was being performed and Sophocles was among the audience in the theatre.

ii), and reading done privately by and for oneself (type iii). In the latter case the actual reader may be a slave, but it is impossible to decide whether e.g. in Galen's text the actual reader is Thrasybulus or his *anagnōstēs*. For my subject this point is unimportant.¹⁰ The main ground for making this distinction within (B) is that the peculiarity of the Greek idiom gets more pronounced in type (iii).

My definite three types of interpretation¹¹ are now as follows:

- (A) (i) The hearer literally heard X saying something;
- (B) (ii) The hearer listened to a public reading by a third person from a text written by X;
- (iii) The hearer himself read, or listened to a reading by his slave, from a text written by X.

Under interpretations (ii) and (iii) we have the subtypes (iib and iiib), that X is identical, not to an author, but to a character in a text written by an author Y, for example in Plut. *Garrul.* 506a ἀκούεις γὰρ λεγούσης (sc. τῆς τρόφου Εὐρυκλείας), followed by *Od.* 19.494.

As to the question whether X is implicitly presented as being alive, it will be clear that in type (i) this is the case, but not necessarily in the other types.¹² I add that in principle the same three interpretations apply to those passages where grammatical persons other than the first singular are the grammatical subject.

Matters apparently get more complicated when the identification of X does not concern a human person but the hearer applies the method (common or literary) or personification of an inanimate thing. Demosthenes, for instance, first instructs the clerk in court to read out a law (λέγε τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα νόμον), when this has been done he continues ἡκούσατε μὲν τοῦ νόμου λέγοντος ἀντικρυς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι κτλ. (23.62). The same personification occurs in Greg. Nyss. *In Eccles.* v. 396.20: ἡκουσα τῆς προφητείας εἰπούσης, whereupon a biblical quotation follows; also in Greg. Naz. (*Or.* 18, xxxv.992.49 PGM¹³) τῆς θείας ἡκουσα λεγούσης Γραφῆς κτλ. and in Luc. *JTr.* 20 ὅταν ἀκούωσι τῶν χρησμῶν λεγόντων, ὡς διαβάς τις τὸν Ἄλυν μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει. The interpretations do not change, but the question about X being alive is no longer relevant. This question, of course, is immaterial, too, when patristic authors present God, or Jesus, as speaking in and through the Bible, e.g. Bas. Caes. *Enarr. in Isaiam* v.167.19 PGM ὡς ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Βασιλειῶν ἡκούσαμεν τοῦ Κυρίου λέγοντος κτλ.¹⁴

IV

Any choice between the three interpretations in individual cases must depend on the context. In principle interpretations (i) and (ii) are easier to accept and therefore preferable to (iii), and I will give specific or general arguments for each classification

¹⁰ Cf. phrases such as 'The king built this palace', where the actual builders are not taken into account.

¹¹ I do not imply that in type (iii) the meaning is different from that in types (i) or (ii); the meaning (semantic level) remains the same, the interpretation (pragmatic level) varies. It depends on one's general views on translation, whether one prefers a literal translation to one which is interpretative at the same time.

¹² Of course, for reasons of his own the hearer may *pretend* that he personally heard X speaking, even when X is dead at the time of the statement, but this is a different matter. I will return to it in Section IX.

¹³ *Patrologiae Graecae Cursus completus*, ed. J.-P. Migne. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Christian authors are by Migne volume, page and line.

¹⁴ P. Trevisan, *San Basilio Commento* (Torino, 1939) puts a comma after Κυρίου. Other editors often follow the same procedure in similar texts, erroneously, although in this way I suspect they hope to avoid the consequences of 'direct perception'.

under type (iii). The choice between types (i) and (ii) is rather easy to make, for example:¹⁵

Type (i): S. *Ph.* 595–6;¹⁶ D. 25.54; Plut. *Conv.* 160d a; Gal. *Alim. fac.* vi.598.10; *Meth. med.* x.560.4.

Type (ii):¹⁷ Athanasius Alex. *Ep. IV ad Serap.* xliiii. 564.32; Greg. Nyss. *Antirrh.* iii 1.140.9; 189.5; Pseudo-Athanasius, *Dial. Athen. Et Zacchaei*, 46.8 Conybeare ἀκούει τοῦ Μωυσέως γράφοντος τὰς τοῦ Ιακώβ εὐλογίας καὶ λόγοντος κτλ.¹⁸

I could have expanded the second group by innumerable passages taken from, especially, the Greek commentaries on Aristotle (CAG), like Ammon. in *Int.* iv 5.90.29ff. ὅτι γὰρ ποτε καὶ παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους γίνεται τις τῶν προτάσεων διαφορά, διδάσκοντος ἀκουσόμεθα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. We can easily imagine a lecture room and Ammonius lecturing there to his pupils and starting to read out a passage from *De interpretatione*. Though this commentary and others may well be based on lecture notes, their introductions suggest rather that they are written commentaries meant for private reading. Therefore, I classify these passages under type (iii).

V

The following uses can also be placed under type (iii). My first example is Aelian, *Nat. Anim.* 7.7 Ἀριστοτέλους ἀκούω λέγοντος ὅτι ἄρα γέραναι ἐκ τοῦ πελάγους ἐς τὴν γῆν πετόμεναι χειμῶνος ἀπειλὴν ἰσχυροῦ ὑποσημαίνουναι τῷ συνιέντι.¹⁹ Aelian often mentions his sources. Very probably, he knows these sources through more recent ones.²⁰ The phrase ἀκούω X λέγοντος occurs in his work several times more,²¹ and according to W. Schmid²² it is one of several ways in which he imitates the style of Herodotus. However, the expression appears to be merely one among Aelian's various ways of introducing sources, cf. Νικάνδρος λέγει (7.8), ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης λέγει (7.9), Ἡγέμων ἐν τοῖς Δαρδανικοῖς μέτροις [...] φησί (7.11) and οὕτω γὰρ Ἀπολλόδωρος θέλει (7.12). Herodotus uses the expression once only,²³ whereas it occurs in texts of authors who have no inclination to imitate Herodotus. For these reasons, the explanation that Aelian refers to his reading is enough.²⁴ Hence this is type (iii).

When writing in *De Demosthene* on Plato's style Dionysius of Halicarnassus often quotes from his works, including ἀκούσωμεν αὐτοῦ, πῶς λέγει: “Ἐργων γὰρ εὖ κτλ.” (c. 26, 184.20 Us.–Rad.). The treatise is a present to Ammaeus, and though we know

¹⁵ Abbreviations here and further on, in general, according to LSJ.

¹⁶ Apparently the oldest example, LSJ s.v. i.f.

¹⁷ Here the selection is very restrictive, for the texts of Gregory of Nyssa alone offer more than 50 items.

¹⁸ Followed by *Gen.* 49.10. This passage can be added to the list of texts quoted by J. Balogh, ‘Voces Paginarum’, *Philologus* 82 (1927), 214ff. as proof that in Antiquity writing aloud was common. Cf. also W. B. Stanford, *The Sound of Greek* (Sather Lect. 38, 1967), p. 3 and note 14.

¹⁹ Cf. a few lines later on ἐρωδιός [...] εἰκεν ὑποδηλοῦν, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης φυλάσας λέγει κτλ. Hercher deletes ὡς... λέγει, Rose (*Aristot. fragm.* 253) keeps it.

²⁰ *RE* s.v. Alexandros 100.

²¹ 5.8; 7.4; 8.4 and 7 etc.

²² W. Schmid–O. Stählin, *Gesch. der gr. Lit.*⁵ (Munich, 1913), ii.2, pp. 768ff.

²³ *Hdt.* 2.32.1 (type (i), of course); ἤκουσα with a single genit. (reporter) or with *acc. cum inf.* (report) occurs eleven times.

²⁴ In 7.8 and 8.6 Αἰγυπτίων ἀκούω λεγόντων the statement implies that Aelian has read somewhere something about the Egyptians, rather than that he has read books in Egyptian.

that Dionysius has given lessons in rhetoric (*CV* 22.94.5), this book is not the written expression of oral lessons, but has been composed for a private reader, as its whole contents clearly show.²⁵ For similar exhortations to read, cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v.14.110 PGM, ἀκούσωμεν οὖν πάλιν Βακχυλίδου τοῦ μελοποιουῦ περὶ τοῦ Θείου λέγοντος κτλ. (followed by fr. 23 Snell); Gal. *Semine* iv. 524.18ff. ἄμεινον δὲ Ἱπποκράτους ἀκοῦσαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος ἐν τῷ περὶ φύσεως παιδίου γράμματι κτλ., where the addressee is being asked to look up a specific passage of Hippocrates.²⁶

Interesting because of its combination of ἀκούειν and ἀναγινώσκειν is Plut. *Fac. in orb. lun.* 938d ἀλλὰ σύ, τὸν Ἀρίσταρχον ἀγαπῶν αἰεὶ καὶ θαυμάζων, οὐκ ἀκούεις Κράτητος ἀναγινώσκοντος...; after these words the dialogue character quotes *Il.* 14.246 + 246a (a 'Plusvers'!). The philologist Theon is asked whether he does not know his Crates, who 'reads'²⁷ more than Aristarchus did.

In an *Appendix* I give a list of references to more passages having the phrase under discussion and where the X is identified. Both this identification and the kind of writing or the context of the quotation preclude interpretations (i) and (ii).

VI

Why do Greek writers, when meaning to say that they have read something somewhere use the locution ἤκουσα X λέγοντος? They could have said 'I've read in Homer that...'. But how does one translate these words into Greek? In Latin the expression *legere apud X aliquid* is usual, as well as that of *legere X*, when X stands for an author.²⁸ I add that phrases such as *audio (-vi) X dicentem (loquentem)* which admit of the interpretation 'I've read in X that...' seem to be almost wholly absent.²⁹ In Greek the usual word for reading,³⁰ ἀναγινώσκειν, normally takes as its complement in the accusative something written, such as a letter, a law, a book (in the latter case often indicated by its title).³¹ In the relatively rare cases an author's name appears, the connotation of 'study, pore over' is often present. Thus Apollonius Dyscolus records this sense when constructing a few examples with ἀναγινώσκειν (*Synt.* 425.5ff.), such as οὐκ ἀνέγνω ὁ δεῖνα Ἀλκαῖον, οὐκ ἀνέγνω Ὁμηρον. He explains the sense of the verb by τὸ ἐν διανοίᾳ καταγίνεσθαι τῶν ποιημάτων. For the

²⁵ In his Loeb translation S. Usher (Dion. Hal., *Crit. Essays*, i) often inserts a 'reader' where the Greek has ἕκαστος, e.g. 24, p. 335, but translates our passage by 'Let us hear how he speaks.'

²⁶ Cf. what is said about Andronicus of Rhodes, ὃς ἐνδέκατος μὲν ἦν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, ἀκούσας δὲ αὐτοῦ (sc. Aristotle) καλοῦντος ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις τοῦδε τοῦ βιβλίου (sc. *Περὶ ἐρμηνείας*) τὰ νοήματα παθήματα κτλ. (Ammon. in *Int.* v.5.28ff.).

²⁷ For ἀναγινώσκειν 'to read' in the sense of 'to adopt a reading' see note 55.

²⁸ E.g. Cic. *Acad.* 2.45.137; Quint. 1.5.61; 3.6.28 and 10.1.96; Suet. *Jul.* 87.1; Plin. *Ep.* 5.3.3, and see *TLL* s.v. *lego* (II), ii.

²⁹ I know one clear example, Cic. *De fin.* 2.90 *idque Socratem, qui voluptatem nullo loco numerat, audio dicentem cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim.* *TLL* s.v. *audio* ii.2c gives more passages with this construction, but all those would fall under my type (i). As to Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* 239.1 *audi igitur me hoc ἀγορευτῶς dicentem* see § XI on the epistolary dialogue.

³⁰ These have been discussed by P. Chantraine in 'Les verbes grecs signifiant "lire" (ἀναγινώσκω, ἐπιλέγομαι, ἐντυγχάνω, ἀναλέγομαι)', published in *ΠΑΓΚΑΡΠΕΙΑ. Mélanges Henri Grégoire 2*, Annuaire de l'Inst. de Philol. et d'Hist. Orientales et Slaves, 10 (1950), pp. 115–26 (not listed in *l'Année phil.*). See also D. J. Allan, 'ἀναγινώσκω and Some Cognate Words', *CQ* 30 (1980), 244–51.

³¹ This usage from Ar. *Ra.* 52 and *Eq.* 1011 onwards, e.g. D.S. 20.1.4 and Luc. *Ind.* 27. In Pl. *O.* 10.1 *Τὸν Ὀλυμπιονίκαν ἀνάγνωτέ μοι Ἀρχεστράτου παῖδα πόθι φρενὸς ἐμᾶς γέγραπται* the sense is 'read out the place where (the name of) the boy of A. is recorded'. See W. J. Verdenius, *Commentaries on Pindar*, ii (Leiden, 1988), *ad loc.*

same use cf. Epict. *Diss.* 1.4.9 (*Χρύσιππον ἀναγινώσκειν*³² = *legere et intelligere*³³); D.H. *Lys.* 11, p. 19.6³⁴; *Act. Ap.* 8.28 and 2 *Ep. Cor.* 3.15. Sometimes this connotation seems to be absent, e.g. in Longinus 34.4 and Plut. *Garr.* 513b. But I have found no texts with a form of *ἀναγινώσκειν* which can serve as an equivalent of the Latin phrase *legere apud X aliquid*. Plut. *Qu. conv.* 724a καίτοι δοκῶ μοι μνημονεύειν ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἀνεγνώκως ἑναγχος, ὅτι κτλ. is not an exact parallel, the reference being to writings on the history of Attica, not 'the Attic writers'; cf. Bas. *Caes. Ep.* 150.2 ἀνέγγων γάρ που ἐν Ψαλμοῖς ὅτι κτλ. Closer to the Latin phrase is Greg. *Naz. Or.* 44 xxxvi.608.13 τῷ Ἡσαΐα ὥσπερ ἀνέγγωμεν, which words stand in the middle of a quotation from Isaiah.³⁵ I have found no further examples.³⁶ Nor are there examples from Classical and Hellenistic prose with *ἀναγινώσκειν ὅτι κτλ.* only; these only appear from Plutarch onwards.

The verbs ἐπιλέγεσθαι, ἀναλέγεσθαι and ἐντυγχάνειν, are sometimes used in the sense of 'to read'³⁷ but when they are accompanied by a complement, this always is a letter, a book, etc., never an author's name. As to ἀκροᾶσθαι, Plut. *Sera num.* 553f., τὰ λοιπὰ δ' Ἡσιόδου χρή νομίζειν ἀκροᾶσθαι λέγοντος κτλ. is the only instance of this verb in an expression of type (ii) or (iii).³⁸

An important conclusion to be drawn from this negative survey is that, as far as we can gather, Galen could not have written to Thrasybulus either *ἀνέγγως δήπου ἀρτίως (παρὰ) Πλάτωνι, ὅτι κτλ. or *ἀνέγγως [...] Πλάτωνα, λέγοντα, ὅτι κτλ.,³⁹ whereas the equivalent locutions are usual in Latin and modern languages. On the other hand, in English one can say 'Yesterday I read the passage where Plato says' but not 'Yesterday I heard Plato saying...', at least, when one refers to the philosopher who died 349/48 B.C. In Greek, however, the latter expression is, as we have seen, the usual way of saying that one has read some statement in (the work of) an author.

The reason why the Greeks adopted this manner of expression, will be a consequence of their habit of reading aloud, whereby the subject literally heard words spoken, whether uttered by himself, by his slave or by anyone else. The transition from 'I directly heard Plato speaking' through 'I heard through my slave Plato speaking' to 'I heard through a text Plato speaking' is smooth enough to have caused the adoption of this phrase, even for situations of silent reading.⁴⁰ The usage may have been encouraged by the fact that e.g. Ὀμηρος λέγει was common in all cases of

³² Cf. 3.2.13ff.

³³ Thus Schweighäuser. I owe the reference to H. F. W. Stollwag, *Epictetus, Het Eerste Boek der Diatriben* (Amsterdam, 1933), p. 125. See also Allan (note 30), pp. 248ff. for the interpretation 'to read and expound'.

³⁴ Cf. *Is.* 111.15; *Dem.* 245.1; *Th.* 347.21 and 413.14; *Imit.* 210.11 U.-R.

³⁵ More examples of this use of the single dative instead of παρὰ + dat. in D. A. Russell on *Longin.* 9.10 and S. L. Radt, *ZPE* 64 (1986), 10ff. and *Mnemos.* 43 (1990), 31.

³⁶ Marin. *Procl.* 12 Boissonade ἀναγινώσκει οὖν παρὰ τούτῳ Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς, Πλάτωνος δὲ τὸν Φαίδωνα refers to 'attend someone's lectures on...' (LSJ s.v. ii).

³⁷ Ἐπιλέγεσθαι, not ἀναγινώσκειν, in this sense in Hdt. (see Powell s.v.), in Paus. 1.12.2 etc., Luc. *VH* 2.36, Hld. *Aeth.* 4.8.1; 10.34.1 etc. For ἀναλέγεσθαι see LSJ s.v. iii ('read through', from Ascl. *AP.* 9.63 onwards), but Chantraine, op. cit. (n. 30), p. 126 is right in calling Wytttenbach's conjecture in Plut. 711d Σαφροῦς ἀναλεγουμένης 'très douteuse'. For ἐντυγχάνειν see LSJ s.v. iii (from Plato, *Lys.* 214b3 onwards) and Chantraine's discussion (pp. 122–6).

³⁸ For ἀκρόασις = 'reading' cf. Th. 1.21 and 22; for ἀκροστής = 'reader' Plb. 9.1.2 etc., and for ἀκροᾶσθαι = 'to read' Str. 1.2.3 etc.

³⁹ In Pl. R. 606e1 ff. ὅταν Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχης λέγουσιν ὡς κτλ. the locution may be compared to our phrase, not to one with ἀναγινώσκειν.

⁴⁰ See G. L. Hendrickson, 'Ancient Reading', *CJ* 25 (1929), 191 on modern examples, like when 'we ask if you have heard from John, who lives perhaps beyond the sea.'

references to what one has read.⁴¹ At the same time one should note that although to all appearances the same habit of reading aloud was common on the Roman side, Latin had a different way of expressing the notion my paper is concerned with.

VII

Shall we put this phrase under metaphorical, figurative language? Thus LSJ s.v. ἀκούω ii.1 in the case of Pl. *R.* 407a7 Φωκυλίδου γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀκούεις, πῶς φησι δειν, ὅταν τῷ ἤδη βίος ᾗ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. The construction is the same as we found in D.H. *Dem.* 26 ἀκούσωμεν αὐτοῦ, πῶς λέγει, and there interpretation (iii) was necessary. Adam *ad loc.* comments: 'Phocylides, being dead, yet speaketh. The present ἀκούεις is just as legitimate as φησί, and well expresses the living voice of poetry in oral circulation.' The *Diccionario Griego-Español* (DGE) s.v. iii.2 classifies this passage as a case of 'contextos en que es imposible la audición directa', and Hendrickson⁴² speaks of 'purely metaphorical usage'. These glosses suggest that the Greek could have used a different expression, a κύριον, in order to formulate the notion of 'reading something in an author's work', but this suggestion is wrong. Therefore, I prefer to speak of catachrestic language. Ancient theory distinguished κατάχρησις from μεταφορά as the case of usage of words in their non-proper sense when the 'proper' words are unavailable.⁴³

VIII

In all examples of the phrase ἤκουσα X λέγοντος I have discussed the X was identified by a personal name. For this reason it was possible to argue more cogently that the interpretations (ii) or (iii) were to the point. When X is left anonymous, the same three interpretations (with their subtypes) are acceptable, but the choice is more difficult. Of course, there is no doubt that E. *Med.* 67 ἤκουσά του λέγοντος and Pl. *Ly.* 215c4 ἤδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος κτλ. come under group (i). Interpretation (ii b) seems preferable in the cases of Plut. *An seni* 789c οὐκ ἀκούομεν ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ στρατιώτου λέγοντος κτλ. and *Qu. cony.* 676c καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι μὲν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ φιλαργύρου τινὸς ἀκούσαι λέγοντος κτλ., although I do not exclude that these passages might come under type (iii b), for the reference is not to a performance in the theatre. In line with my method I shall again offer specific arguments for the adoption of interpretation (iii).

My first case concerns the assertion that if Zeus speaks Greek he will do so in Plato's manner. This, Cic. *Brut.* 121 says, is an opinion of philosophers: *Quis enim uberius in dicendo Platone? Iovem sic aiunt philosophi, si Graece loquatur, loqui.* D.H. *Dem.* 23, p. 178.12ff. knows of the same claim but puts it differently: ἤδη δέ τινων ἤκουσα ἐγὼ λεγόντων ὥς, εἰ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς διάλεκτός ἐστιν, ἡ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κέχρηται γένος, οὐκ ἄλλως ὁ βασιλεὺς ὦν αὐτῶν διαλέγεται θεὸς ἢ Πλάτων. A scholiast *ad loc.* annotates τάχα τοῦ Κικέρωνος, but then he makes the same error Plut. *Cic.* 24.5 committed by ascribing to Cicero what Cicero himself had borrowed

⁴¹ And by the fact that authors of books with a claim to literary merit wrote these to be read aloud, cf. B. Knox, 'Books and Readers in the Greek World', in P. E. Easterling and B. M. W. Knox (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, i (Cambridge, 1985), p. 14.

⁴² P. 192 (note 40). See also Knox (note 2), p. 434.

⁴³ E.g. Quint. 8.6.34 *abusio est ubi nomen defuit, translatio ubi aliquid fuit*. A survey of ancient theories on κατάχρησις may be found in J. A. Schuurmsma, *De poetica vocabulorum abusione apud Aeschylum* (Amsterdam, 1932), pp. 3–11.

from others. Moreover, Dionysius' phrasing shows that Cicero cannot be his source. It cannot be excluded, of course, that Dionysius heard this view from persons alive at that time, but I prefer to think that Dionysius repeats what he has read somewhere. F. Walsdorff has made a good case for the view that this opinion of Plato's style derives from the circle of Philo of Larissa. He died before Dionysius reached Rome.⁴⁴

Greg. Nyss. *In inscr. psalm.* v.30.24ff. says ἡκουσά τινος τῶν σοφῶν τὸν περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν διεξιόντος λόγον, ὅτι μικρός τις κόσμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνθρώπος. This view has a long pedigree; it is found already in Democritus, B 34 D.K. Interpretation (iii) is quite possible. The same conclusion will do for Greg. Naz. *Or.* 40 xxxvi.420.6ff. ἡκουσα τῶν σοφῶν τινος λέγοντος κτλ., for the statement that follows, a scholiast *ad loc.* tells us, is found in a work of Gregory Thaumaturgus, who died before the other Gregory was born. When Dio Chrysostomus, to take another example, tells us (*Or.* 9.31 Arnim) ἐγὼ δὲ ἡκουσά του λέγοντος, ὅτι ἡ Σφίγξ ἡ ἀμαθία ἐστίν, we need not think of a personal oral communication but of a report on his reading, for the same view recurs in Cebes, *Tab.* 3.2 ἡ γὰρ ἀφροσύνη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις Σφίγξ ἐστίν. Further examples, with a short defence where necessary, will be found in the second part of the *Appendix*.

For these passages, each with its reference to what someone has read somewhere and where we can point to a parallel text, one suspects that the author could have mentioned his source by name as well. The reason why he chose not to do so will be related to matters of style and literary genre. In orations, for example, it would have been pedantic to name the philosophers you had consulted for a specific statement; this would certainly be the case in Him. *Or.* 74.4 (see *Appendix*), for that is claimed to be an extempore speech. At another time a direct reference to a host of witnesses, even when unidentified, may be thought to be impressive, more than a dry statement that you found your story in one particular book. Thus, e.g. Hermog. *Id.* 2.11. But other reasons, of course, may have led an author to make his particular choice.

IX

The first instance of a passage of type (iii) with a reference to unidentified persons seems to occur in the introduction of the Hippocratic treatise *De natura hominis*: ὁστις μὲν εἰωθεν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ἀμφὶ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προσωτέρω ἢ ὁκόσον αὐτῆς ἐς ἡτρικὴν ἐφήκει, τουτέω μὲν οὐκ ἐπιτήδειος ὁδε ὁ λόγος ἀκούειν (vi.32.1–3 Littré). Later on, the text has references to disputes between philosophers (e.g. line 15 ἀντιλέγουσιν). In his study on the development of Greek science G. E. R. Lloyd takes this passage as the starting point for his argument that at the end of the fifth or the beginning of the fourth century B.C. public debates on medical matters were being organized, where, moreover, a lay audience was present.⁴⁵ Because of the use of ἀκούειν in line 3 Lloyd identifies the treatise as a 'lecture'. One should not forget, however, that already Hippocrates in connection with his activities as an author uses the verb γράφειν, e.g. *Prorrh.* ii.1.21 Ἐγὼ δὲ τοιαῦτα μὲν οὐ μαντεύσομαι, σημεῖα δὲ γράφω.⁴⁶ I also think of the introductory words of Hecataeus, quoted by Demetr. *Eloc.* 12 Ἐκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι. Neglect of the possibility of the 'reading' interpretation I am defending in this paper is one of the reasons, I think, why classical

⁴⁴ F. Walsdorff, *Die antiken Urteile über Platons Stil* (Bonn, 1927), pp. 49ff.

⁴⁵ *Magic, Reason and Experience. Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 92ff.

⁴⁶ Cf. 2.4.76ff. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν γράφω περὶ τούτων, καὶ λέγω τοιαῦτα ἕτερα.

scholars are nowadays conditioned, as it were, to detect everywhere in the fifth and fourth century signs of oral culture. Lloyd may well be right in his interpretation for we have no comparably early parallel of use of type (iii).⁴⁷ However, I stress my point that an occurrence of the verb ἀκούειν is not an immediate proof for oral communication. Further research on oral tradition and literacy will have to take into account these linguistic data.⁴⁸

In Section III, note 12 the possibility was mentioned that someone is pretending that he heard a person saying something. From this point of view we may now look at what Xenophon says in *Oec.* 1.1, ἤκουσα δέ ποτε αὐτοῦ (sc. Socrates) καὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας τοιάδε διαλεγόμενον. Should one take these words as an assertion that at one time Xenophon personally heard Socrates uttering these (type (i)) or think that he has read them somewhere (type (iii b)⁴⁹)? Under the first interpretation the assertion cannot be true. For it has been proved that some of Socrates' remarks concern Cyrus the Younger and thus 'refer to the period after Xenophon had left Athens',⁵⁰ not to return to Athens until after Socrates' death. The second interpretation, although it cannot be proved or disproved, seems likely to correspond to the truth. Nevertheless, I am very much inclined to accept the former interpretation and to suppose the use of a literary fiction. One reason is that examples of my locution requiring interpretation of type (iii) are not found before the Hellenistic period; another is the following consideration. The Socratic dialogues offered to Xenophon the opportunity to present as a result of personal observation what he knew about Socrates secondhand,⁵¹ the more so because to read was to hear at the same time. A consequence of this interpretation is, of course, that one should be cautious in accepting Xenophon's further statements about his personal experiences with Socrates, e.g. those in *Mem.* 2.4.1 and 5.1, as true and reliable.

Somewhat in line with the foregoing is the interpretation of a passage from Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Republic*. In the sixth essay (i.69.20ff. Kroll) Proclus tells us that on the occasion of Plato's birthday he gave a lecture on Plato's treatment of Homer and poetry in the *Republic*. He is now writing this lecture down, also taking into account the opinions of his teacher Syrianus (71.2ff.): φέρ' οὖν ὅσα κἀνταῦθα τοῦ καθηγεμόνος ἡμῶν ἠκούσαμεν περὶ τούτων διαταπτομένου [...] διέλθωμεν κτλ. Anne Sheppard interprets these words as a reference to a lecture by Syrianus that Proclus had attended.⁵² In a note she says: 'Notice ἠκούσαμεν, but the word may not be as significant as it looks at first sight. Julian (*Or.* v, 162 c) can speak of "hearing" Xenocrates who lived in the time of Augustus.' Now that we have come across a whole array of similar passages which require the 'reading' interpretation, the argument about Proclus' personal attendance at a lecture of Syrianus has become even less convincing.

⁴⁷ At any rate, if it was a public lecture, it must have been written down later to be read by others.

⁴⁸ Nothing pertinent on this linguistic aspect in E. A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963) and his later publications and neither in W. V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). Rosalind Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989), rightly stresses the coexistence of oral and literate modes of thought in the fourth century but is sometimes too careful to accept as preferable interpretations of reading, e.g. pp. 51 and 61 on σκοπεῖν, for which one may compare ἐφορᾶν in Hdt. 1.48 (see § X).

⁴⁹ Socrates did not leave any writings; therefore subtype (iii b).

⁵⁰ J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London, 1974), p. 174.

⁵¹ See for this matter of Socratic dialogues by Aeschines and others also S. R. Slings, *A Commentary on the Platonic Clitopho* (Amsterdam, 1981), pp. 27f.

⁵² *Studies on 5th and 6th Essays of Proclus' Commentary on the Republic* (Göttingen, 1980), p. 31.

X

In this connection we should remember that *ἀκούειν* without a participle construction is often used in the context of ‘reading by oneself’. G. L. Hendrickson (see note 40) accepted this interpretation for Herodotus 1.48: Croesus had sent for responses from many oracles; the others he just scanned (*ἐπορᾶ*), *ὁ δὲ ὡς τὸ ἐκ Δελφῶν ἤκουσε κτλ.* Hendrickson also referred to the use of *οἱ ἀκούοντες* and *ἀκοή* in this sense in Polybius.⁵³ In the third part of the *Appendix* I list a select number of passages with forms of *ἀκούειν*, *ἀκοή* and similar words which I interpret as referring to reading.⁵⁴ I do not distinguish between cases in which *ἀκούειν* governs an author’s name in the genitive or a book (mostly) in the accusative.⁵⁵ The list is restricted to examples from Classical and Hellenistic authors (with one exception).⁵⁶

XI

The use of *ἀκούειν* in letters deserves a separate discussion. Demetr. *Eloc.* 223 quotes the view of Artemon that a letter is *οἶον τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τοῦ διαλόγου*. He does not wholly agree with Artemon and accepts as a letter’s essential trait ‘die Schriftlichkeit des Gesprächs zwischen φίλοι’.⁵⁷ Thraede, pp. 27ff. and 47ff. has traced this view in other authors, and his conclusion that it was widespread makes one hesitate about treating here the use of *ἀκούειν* in letters. For, starting from the idea of a letter as part of a conversation on paper a Greek may easily tend to stress this aspect by means of the verb *ἀκούειν*. In foregoing sections I sometimes took my examples from letters, it is true, but in those cases we had to do with statements such as in Greg. Nyss. *Ep.* 28.1 (see *Appendix*) where the author tells his correspondent what he had read. Nor is it difficult to interpret the statement in Lib. *Ep.* 344.3 *ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐξέυρες ἴασιν ἀκοῦσαι διὰ γραμμάτων ἂν διὰ φωνῆς οὐκ ἦν κτλ.*⁵⁸

But in all the instances where Libanius writes to his addressee *ἤκουσα*, *ἤκουσαμεν*, *ἄκουε*, *ἄκουσον*, or similar terms, shall we think of a *façon de parler* and imagine that he deliberately maintains the code of a conversation? There are some indications to the contrary. These come in the first place from the passages quoted, which prove that at times Libanius bears in mind the written character of a letter and, consequently, does not keep to the fiction of a discussion by letter. Further, in *Ep.* 944.1 he begins: *λαβὼν σου τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἡλπιζον μὲν ἀκούσεσθαι παρ’ αὐτῆς κτλ.*, and tells his correspondent that he did not find the message he had expected. If there is a literary fiction here, it is that of ‘personification’. Then, countless times after the arrival of a

⁵³ E.g. 1.13.6 (*οἱ ἀκούοντες*) and 12.27.1–2 (*ἀκοή*).

⁵⁴ Not so Thuc. 7.16 *οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες* (sc. *τῆς ἐπιστολῆς*) (the letter was read out to the audience, cf. 10), nor Isocr. *Pan.* 168 *τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ἢ τίς οὐκ ἀκήκοε τῶν τραγωδοδιδασκάλων Διονυσίοις τὰς Ἀδράστου [...]* *συμφορὰς κτλ.*

⁵⁵ I am not concerned here with the use of *ἀκούειν* in the technical sense of ‘to understand, take in a certain sense’ (LSJ s.v. iv) but only point out that this usage occurs much earlier than LSJ (Jul. Or. 4.147a) and DGE (Athenaeus and Galen) suggest, although for *ἀκουστέον* they give texts from Strabo. The earliest occurrence is in the Derveni Papyrus, whereas the title of Chrysippus’ *περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκούειν* (D.L. 7.200) comes next. See also Ph. *Leg. Alleg.* 2.16; *Heres.* 292.1 and Plut. *Solon* 25.4.

For *ἀναγιγνώσκειν* in the sense of ‘to adopt a reading’ both dictionaries refer to *Sch. Ar. Pax* 593, but this use is very common from S.E. *M.* 1.59 and Gal. *Elem.* i.438.12 onwards.

⁵⁶ See note 38 for similar passages with *ἀκροάσθαι* etc.

⁵⁷ Kl. Thraede, *Grundzüge griech.-röm. Brieftopik* (Munich, 1970), p. 22.

⁵⁸ Cf. *Ep.* 978.2 *δι’ ἐπιστολῶν ἀκούσας*.

letter Libanius replies with words like ἀκούσας ὅτι [...], ἥσθην.⁵⁹ In *Ep.* 1075.1 he tells a funny story, which he introduces thus: ἐγὼ μὲν ἐγέλασα, σὺ δὲ ὀργῆς μεστὸς ἔση ἀκούσας τὸ πεπραγμένον. Taking all these indications together, I think that e.g. in *Ep.* 535.3 ἄκουε δὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον (followed by an anecdote) the interpretation 'read' is obvious.⁶⁰

XII

Looking back at the foregoing sections one will observe a chronological difference between the use of ἀκούειν = 'to read' and that of ἤκουσα X λέγοντος coming under interpretation (iii). The former use is attested from Herodotus onwards (§ X), interpretations (i) and (ii) of the latter expression are found from the fifth century onwards (§ IV), but with the possible exception of Hippocrates and Xenophon (§ IX), interpretation (iii) with its reference to reading occurs from the end of the Hellenistic period only (§ V). Of course, loss of texts may colour this picture and it is not unreasonable to suppose that especially the loss of scholarly texts from the Hellenistic period influences my results. Nevertheless, provisionally I think it safer to assume that Hellenistic prose writers felt a need for greater precision⁶¹ and therefore widened the range of the expression, thus also acquiring an easy means of combining the reference to their source with the content of what it said. In this connection the observation is relevant that in Classical prose there are no examples of either ἀναγινώσκειν ὅτι κτλ. or ἀκούειν (παρὰ X) ὅτι κτλ. which report the content of the reading, only a few with a more complex construction, like the Platonic Φωκυλιδέω . . οὐκ ἀκούεις, πῶς κτλ. (§ VI). Presumably the need for such a device was met by the expression ἤκουσα X λέγοντος.

Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam

DIRK M. SCHENKEVELD

APPENDIX

Further examples of type (iii).

(I) With identification of the source

Str. 1.2.3; Gal. *Adhort.* 10.34 Wenkebach; *Anat. adm.* ii.674.11; *Usu part.* iv.266.4ff.; *Loc. aff.* viii.113.9f. etc. etc.; Charito, *Chaer. et Call.* 2.3.7; Ael. *NA* 5.38; Plut. *Virt. mor.* 443b; *Cupid.* 527a; *Amat.* 756d; Luc. *Sacr.* 8; S.E. *P.* 2.22; Plot. *Enn.* 2.9.17.1; Jul. *Or.* 5.162c; Procl. in *Euc.* 171.16; Olymp. in *Cat.* xii.1.76.28; Phlp. *Aet. m.* 365.14 Rabe and many others from CAG; Greg. Naz. *Contra Arrianos* xxxvi.228.38; *Or.* 45 xxxvi.409.38; Theodor. *Graec. aff.* 2.44, p. 49.3 Raeder.

(II) Without identification

D.H. *AR* 1.25 (with reference to passages from Sophocles and Thucydides); Philo, *Conf. ling.* (the reference is to LXX, *Za.* 6.12); Luc. *Sat.* 20 (followed by a quotation from Hesiod, *Op.* 109); id. *Gall.* 14 (two quotations from Homer, *Il.* 14.214 and Eurip. fr. 324.11 respectively); cf. *Hist. Conscr.* 28.1 and *Sacr.* 14; Hermog. *Id.* 2.11, p. 400.11ff. Rabe (a statement which, according to Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X orat.* 832e Caecilius (fr. 99 Ofenloch) had made); Greg. Nyss. *Virg.* viii.1.331.10 (with an

⁵⁹ E.g. *Epp.* 662.1; 879.1; 904.1; 929.1; 956.1; 1320.1; 1533.1.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Epp.* 695.5 and 1400.3.

⁶¹ For similar examples see e.g. J. Palm, *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien* (Lund, 1955), Sachindex s.v. 'Analytischer Tendenz'.

opinion parallels to which are given by Aubineau⁶²); Id. *Ep.* 28.1 (for parallels I refer to the article of I. R. Asmus⁶³); Him. *Or.* 74.4 Colonna (for which see my article in *CQ* 41 (1991), and Syn. *Ep.* 138 Garzya.⁶⁴ I put here four more passages but cannot cite parallels: Phld. *Mus.* 95.15 Kemke; D. Chr. *Or.* 10.148; Gal. *Foet. form.* iv.696.16ff. and Philostr. *Ep.* 1.16 (ii.233.24 Kayser).

(III) *Examples of ἀκούειν = 'to read'*

Pl. *Phdr.* 268c;⁶⁵ 275a; 235b–c; 261b; *Alc.* I 112b; *Lg.* 629b; X. *Mem.* 2.6.11; Arist. *EN* 1095b8; Polyb. 1.63.4; D.S. 19.8.4; D.H. *CV* 25, p. 122.13.

In *Ad iuv.* 5.25 (ὥς δ' ἐγὼ τινος ἤκουσα δεινοῦ καταμαθεῖν ἀνδρὸς ποιητοῦ διάνοιαν) Basilus mentions the moral exegesis of Odysseus' behaviour to the Phaeacians (*Od.* 6.135ff.). This exegesis, be it with a different moral, is found also in Muson. Ruf. 46.3 and Epict. 3.26.33, and, now with the same lesson, in Lib. *Laus Odys.* 21 (*Prog.* 8.2.1 = viii.233–4 Foerster). I take these parallels from the commentary of N. G. Wilson.⁶⁶ Like previous commentators, Wilson thinks that the τὴς of line 25 'may refer to the famous rhetorician and writer Libanius, whose acquaintance B. had probably [*sic*] made in Constantinople.' The possibility that Basilus only read Libanius' work, or that of another author, and, consequently, may have meant his remark as such, has not been considered at all.⁶⁷

⁶² In his edition in the *Sources Chrétiennes* 119, p. 516, also referring to the survey in A.-J. Festugière, *Hippocrate, l'Ancienne Médecine* (Paris, 1948), pp. xx–xxvii.

⁶³ In *Theol. Stud. u. Kritiken* 67.2 (1894), pp. 314ff. I owe this reference to V. Pöschl (ed.), *Bibliogr. z. ant. Bildersprache* (Heidelberg, 1964), s.v. *Rose unter Dornen*.

⁶⁴ Kl. Thraede, op. cit. (note 57), pp. 180ff., takes these words as a reference to a real occasion, but quotes enough parallels for the view mentioned by Synesius to make my interpretation plausible.

⁶⁵ 'This may reflect the ancient habit of reading aloud.' Thus G. J. de Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato* (Amsterdam, 1969), *ad loc.* More positively Hendrickson, op. cit. (note 40), p. 189.

⁶⁶ *St. Basil on Greek Literature* (London, 1975), p. 52.

⁶⁷ I do not quote from Plut. *Quomodo adul.*, although it seems obvious that he will use ἀκούειν in the sense of 'reading' also. But it is not easy to distinguish situations where one of the two fathers, a paedagogus, or a teacher, is supposed to read from a book to the boys from those where they read by themselves. However, I am convinced that in 37a ἡττον ταραττονται καὶ δυσκολεύονται παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀκούοντες ὥς κτλ. the plural φιλοσόφοις points the way to an interpretation of type (iii).

I thank the members of the 'Hellenisten Club' in Amsterdam for their stimulating comments on an earlier draft, and the Editor of this journal for his suggestions.